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Abstract. Patient records and their disease and 
treatment history can be scattered among 
healthcare providers. Sharing the knowledge 
effectively and, at the same time, respecting 
patient privacy is crucial in providing safe and 
accurate clinical decision support systems 
(CDSSs). In this paper we reflect upon our 
experience in the HealthAgents project wherein a 
prototype system was developed and a novel 
approach employed that supports data transfer 
and decision making in human brain tumour 
diagnosis. Here we examine the capability of the 
Lightweight Coordination Calculus (LCC), a 
process calculus-based language, in combining 
together distributed healthcare services and 
meeting security challenges in pervasive settings. 
The result is that various clinical specialisms, 
being captured in representational abstractions 
and making contribution to patient diagnosis and 
management, retain their autonomy. However, at 
the same time, the behaviour of specialists in 
sharing clinical knowledge about their patients 
and providing clinical support is constrained by 
policies and rules in respect of their own clinical 
duties and responsibilities. Being introduced into 
the programme of the HRB Centre for Primary 
Care Research, this novel approach has the 
potential to help the provision of optimal 
solutions in data linkage and sharing across the 
Primary and Secondary Care interface. As added 
value, its application also advances the process 
of integrating clinical prediction rules and 
implementing CDSSs in practice and, ultimately, 
the improvement of quality of care. 
 
Keywords. Clinical decision support, 
healthcare knowledge sharing, Lightweight 
Coordination Calculus, patient privacy  
 
1. Introduction 
 
The vision of pervasive healthcare gives a 
picture wherein “smart” software agents would 
act on behalf of human specialists in collecting 
or monitoring critical life support data, extracting 
information from the data, jigsawing it together, 
and eventually enabling decisions and actions to 
be taken on the outcome of such processes. This 
requires the move from a “patient-seeing-doctor” 
pattern to a new healthcare paradigm which 
emphasises a degree of continuous medical 
surveillance, with key decisions for medical 
follow-ups requiring automated processing, and 
in a decentralised manner. 
Given the distributed nature of not only the 
data but also the care providers or specialists 
accessing the data and making decisions, a major 
concern of the new healthcare paradigm is to 
ensure the data are delivered to the right person 
at the right moment. Thus far, tacit knowledge is 
largely explicit only to isolated specialists, 
organisations and professional guilds. Although 
the necessity of collaboration has been 
recognised, there is little systematic knowledge 
sharing of clinical intervention outcomes. 
In the modern world, it is not a surprise to 
find that a patient is seen and receives 
consultation from his or her GP; after referral the 
patient is examined in one hospital; his/her case 
is reviewed by clinicians from another hospital; 
and he/she is treated in a third hospital by yet 
another group of clinicians due to speciality and 
availability. Data about a particular patient might 
be held by different GP systems and different 
departments within one or more hospitals which 
are possibly located in different countries. 
Effectively sharing such knowledge, 
automatically processing it, and using the 
appropriate pieces and gluing them together for 
the final clinical decision support, yet respecting 
patient privacy and ethical  regulations in the 
entire process, have significant impact on the 
quality of care that one is offered.  
This paper describes an approach that 
addresses the need for knowledge sharing and 
data protection in the setting of a particular 
clinical decision support system (CDSS), the 
outcome of an EU Framework 6 project 
HealthAgents [6]. The system has been 
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implemented with much medical input and will 
facilitate clinicians to make better diagnosis of 
brain tumours. Here we advance the use of 
Lightweight Coordination Calculus (LCC) models, 
work from another EU Framework 6 project 
OpenKnowledge [8], upon this system and which 
bring better knowledge sharing capabilities 
among healthcare professionals in a distributed 
environment and at the same time facilitate better 
access control. The contribution of bringing 
together the two pieces of work is reported in the 
paper. 
 
2. Patient privacy and confidentiality 
 
A CDSS is at its most useful if patient-
specific decision support can be given in the 
current clinical pathway, taking into account 
both the patient’s medical record and the 
decision support knowledge applicable to this 
patient. A major difficulty in building a CDSS 
lies in the scattering of the electronic healthcare 
records among various care providers, a fact that 
makes it necessary to have relevant information 
linked and shared for decision making and at the 
same time patient’s confidentiality respected. 
Challenges are seen in different countries. For 
example, in Ireland, there is no unique identifier 
for linking Electronic Healthcare Records (EHR) 
which are scattered across public and private 
sectors and managed by four separate GP 
systems and many more hospital systems. In 
order to address a similar problem, in 1992, the 
National Health Service (NHS) in the UK 
attempted to build a unified electronic patient 
record system and give access to extended NHS 
community. This has been opposed [1] [2] for 
the reason that such a system, collecting data 
from existing GP systems but out of their 
control, is in conflict with the ethical principle 
that no patient should be identifiable other than 
to the GP without patient consent [3] and the 
result from a survey that most patients are 
unwilling to share their information with NHS 
[4]. Healthcare data, being scattered but not 
consolidated for confidentiality reasons, will 
have to be shared among care providers and 
specialists on a need basis for the best delivery of 
care in a distributed information system. The fact 
that separately stored patient records and clinical 
information can now be made easily accessible 
to a wider range of people implies that a trust 
relationship must be built up between the 
patients and the distributed healthcare services 
rather than the doctors.   
Building such trust into a distributed 
healthcare service or information system requires 
us to set up two types of constraints. 
1) Only relevant clinicians who have real life 
relationships with patients in clinical centres 
should access their records. Two of the access 
control policy principles British Medical 
Association put forward [1] are as follows. 
Principle of Access: “Each identifiable 
clinical record shall be marked with an access 
control list naming the people or groups of 
people who may read it and append data to it. 
The system shall prevent anyone not on the 
access control list from accessing the record in 
any way.”  
Principle of Control: “One of the clinicians 
on the access control list must be marked as 
being responsible. Only she may alter the access 
control list, and she may only add other 
healthcare professionals to it.” 
2) Clinicians should only have access to 
particular record parts on the basis of their need 
for providing care and treatment. It is often the 
clinical expertise that determines the actual needs 
of access, to the data parts clinicians routinely 
work with and by doing so, healthcare roles 
fulfilled. Such role-based access [5] is assured to 
NHS patients [10] and is necessary for data 
protection in other jurisdictions. For example, a 
receptionist booking an appointment will only 
have access to basic information to identify a 
patient and make the booking; pathology medical 
records or reports may be sent to a pathologist 
involved in a patient’s care; prescription sent to a 
pharmacist; and sensitive parts not sent out at all.  
A named responsible clinician, presumably a 
patient GP, determines the clinical roles that each 
care team member or specialist fulfils. Normally, 
every member or specialist can read the full 
records and write to the parts they are 
responsible for. The control of access needs to be 
strict but flexible. It is up to the actual access 
needs of the clinicians who actually deliver care 
to the patient that the record controller or a GP 
governs who can access what. This paper 
investigates how such access control can be 
implemented in a particular CDSS but does not 
impose any specific policy. 
 
3. LCC and interaction models 
 
We shall use the formalism of Lightweight 
Coordination Calculus, LCC [8] which is a logic 
programming language, to lay out the various 
domains of expertise that are called upon to 
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accumulate clinical knowledge and evidence as 
well as to process these for better care delivery. 
We tolerate the diversity and heterogeneity while 
systematically choreographing individual 
resources to combine their knowledge of a 
particular patient or disease. This shift of 
emphasis immediately suggests taking a process 
oriented view for system design and analysis. As 
a system, supporting healthcare provided by 
multi-disciplinary teams requires dealing with 
groups of people who rarely had their systems 
engineered to do tasks together.  This also fits the 
paradigm of concurrency where there is no single 
locus of control of task execution. Instead of the 
other resources existing merely to serve the 
control unit, these entities lead an autonomous 
existence and only undergo message-induced 
transitions upon opening up access to each other: 
centralised control gives way to concurrent 
processes wherein each party accomplishes the 
tasks allocated to it and exposes the results to 
accommodate requests from others. Moreover, 
this interaction-based sharing of information 
enables dynamic knowledge composition: by 
sharing knowledge through interactions we 
indirectly share data.  We later demonstrate that 
leveraging interaction models as opposed to 
trying to combine knowledge in the traditional 
manner benefits healthcare knowledge 
management and complements the existing work 
in the HealthAgents project. 
Precisely, LCC is a process calculus for 
specifying coordination among multiple 
participants. It accomplishes this by clearly 
stating what role an individual plays in a 
messaging process. An LCC model is built upon 
the principle that role-playing agents should obey 
the laws and/or protocols that are explicitly 
specified against the roles that such agents are 
expected to take. LCC ensures the fulfilment of 
roles by individuals through regulating the 
message-flows among them. These include: the 
messages that should be sent and are expected to 
be received and what constraints should be 
satisfied before a message can be handled. The 
full picture of LCC syntax is shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. Grammar of LCC 
In LCC interaction model, we use predicate 
a(id, role) to specify the role that an individual is 
playing,  and ⇐ to specify the direction of 
message flow, and  for constraints. Term and 
Constant are implementation-specific. In the 
current version, Term is a well-formed formula 
in Prolog logic programming language and 
Constant is a Prolog constant starting with a 
lowercase letter. LCC also provides constructs 
for parallel (par), sequential (then) and switch 
branching (or) controls. 
 
Figure 2. An example of LCC 
Interpreting LCC is equivalent to unpacking 
LCC clauses, finding the next tasks that it is 
permitted to perform and updating the status of 
an interaction accordingly. For instance, in the 
above LCC interaction model, the sequence 
construct then is unfolded by examining the first 
part of the sequence or, if it is closed (i.e. 
executed), unfolding the next part. After 
unfolding, the system tries to instantiate all the 
variables (e.g. P and A) to examine the satisfy-
ability of LCC clauses. A narrative interpretation 
of the LCC model in Figure 2, therefore, reads 
“when an on call doctor receives a routine check 
request on a patient (P), he/she first asks an 
arbitrary nurse (S) to take P's body temperature. 
When the body temperature is done, he/she asks 
an arbitrary nurse (T) to take P's blood sample if 
P has not been given blood test before.” Note 
that whether nurses S and T are one and the same 
person is unknown from the context. 
 
4. Modelling healthcare interaction 
process in HealthAgents using LCC 
 
When LCC interaction models are used in 
healthcare, knowledge management is built upon 
an awareness of the flow of healthcare 
information within the system, reflecting 
protocols and guidelines driven by legal and 
ethical concerns. Tacit knowledge is, therefore, 
observed through the patterns of messages. Such 
a transparent knowledge acquisition procedure 
implies the way that one learns can be literally 
copied with the same conclusion as long as the 
same contexts are reconstructed.  
The HealthAgents [6] system is a distributed 
decision support system that supports diagnosis 
and prognosis, employs a set of distributed nodes 
that either store patient case data, build 
classifiers that are trained upon case data and 
capable of classifying tumour types, or use 
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classifiers for the diagnosis and prognosis of 
brain tumours. The magnetic resonance 
spectroscopy (MRS) data used by the system is 
built up using anonymous information from child 
and adult cases. Classifiers are created by the 
producer nodes that receive requests from the 
clinicians to generate classifiers for particular 
tumours. Clinicians will employ classifiers which 
assist in the diagnosis of patients for particular 
tumours. The HealthAgents system consists of a 
variety of agents each charged with a different 
task (see [7] for more detailed description of the 
HealthAgents components and architecture). 
Figure 3 shows the interaction model where a 
patient case is first retrieved, then relevant 
classifiers invoked, case classification performed 
and finally, the diagnosis results updated as well 
as the ranking of involved classifiers.  
 
Figure 3. A HealthAgents Interaction Model  
The following LCC clauses show its specification. 
The clinician plays a role of classification (R1) and 
updating case profile (R5). The role changes when an 
accurate diagnosis result is known.  
/* R1: classify a case */ 
a(clinician_classify, CID) :: 
  requestCaseRecordByID(I)  a(database, DBID) then 
  caseRecord (R) ⇐ a(database, DBID) then 
  requestClassification(R, C)  a(classifier_petitioner, CPID) 
then 
  classificationResults(S) ⇐ a(classifier_petitioner, CPID) then  
  a(clinician_followingdiagnosis, CID) 
/* R5: update case record and classifier reputation following 
diagnosis */ 
a(clinician_followingdiagnosis, CID) :: 
  ( updateCaseRecordByID(I)  a(database_update, DBID) then 
    caseRecordUpdated(Y) ⇐ a (database_update, DBID) )  
  par 
  ( updateClassifier(I)  a(classifier_petitioner, CPID) then 
    classifierUpdated(Y) ⇐ a (classifier_petitioner, CPID) ) 
A clinician CID shall initialise an interaction 
for a case classification by sending to a database 
agent a request for retrieving case I. CID then 
expects to receive the case with which he or she 
can request a classifier petitioner to perform 
classification on his or her behalf. A set of 
classification results given by various classifiers 
being received, the clinician is supported to make 
a decision about the diagnosis, depending upon 
his or her confidence on the classifiers and his or 
her own expertise.  Now the clinician can change 
the role from R1 to R5 which will be activated if 
the actual diagnosis result is known. At that time, 
the clinician can update the case and the 
reputation values of the classifiers, after 
comparing the actual diagnosis result and the 
results suggested by the classifiers in the 
previous interaction. 
Obviously, the clinician who performs the 
classification and diagnosis, the database where 
the case resides, the classifiers which give the 
classification can be distributed in different 
locations. The interaction model pulls together 
the different parties, defines the manner of 
knowledge acquisition, human computer 
interaction, expertise involvement, clinical 
decision support, and finally the care delivery. 
 
5. Taking into account the privacy issues 
 
In Section 4 we give the role definitions of R1 
and R5 with regard to the behaviour of a 
clinician for knowledge sharing and decision 
making in HealthAgents. The two constraints 
outlined in Section 2 must be respected in such a 
process – the named clinician must have the right 
permission to have access to that case and to 
perform the specified operation upon the case.  
The following LCC clauses describe the 
fundamental interaction pattern for resource 
access control. 
a(resource_request, RRID) :: 
  request(Resource, Operation, Context)  a(resource_manager, 
RMID)  
a(resource_manager, RMID) :: 
  request(Resource, Operation, Context) ⇐ a(resource_request, 
RRID)  grantPermission(RRID, Resource, Operation, Context, 
Policies) then ( 
    response(Grant_yes)  a(resource_request, RRID) or 
    response(Resource_result)  a(resource_request, RRID)  
getOperationResult(Resource, Operation, Access_result) ) 
a(resource_request, RRID) and 
a(resource_manager, RMID) define two agents, 
RRID and RMID, play the roles of 
resource_request and resource_manager, 
respectively. The former role has been 
instantiated in R1 and R5 in the previous section, 
where a message of resource access request is 
sent from the agent that plays the request role to 
the agent that plays the manager role. Upon 
receipt of this message, the resource manager 
agent applies appropriate security policies and 
responds by sending back a message either 
saying the request has been granted (or rejected) 
or by providing the actual resources (or the 
results of their usage) being requested. It is in the 
latter role, that a constraint must be checked as 
satisfactory before the entire interaction model 
proceeds and the resources are returned. 
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Generically, “ grantPermission(RRID, Resource, Operation, 
Context, Policies)” says this constraint will be met 
(evaluation results to a Boolean value of true) if 
RRID can perform Operation upon Resource 
under Context, according to Policies. 
An interaction model is uniquely defined and 
its running context varies, e.g. involved 
clinicians and cases. A resource manager must 
check the request (resource and operation) 
against the requester identity at runtime, in 
compliance with the access policies. Specifically, 
the clinician must be a member of the workgroup 
delivering care to the owner of the case before 
the case is allowed to be updated. Additional 
local policy rules must also be satisfied to 
accommodate necessary constraints. A generic 
policy rule schema is described in [7] for this 
purpose. The following shows the LCC 
constraints used by the database agent, being a 
resource manager, for permission checking 
before the actual role functions are carried out. 
The database agent issues a case record (R2) and 
updates the same record (R6), different levels of 
permissions being needed.  
/* R2: send a case record for classification */ 
a(database_download, DBID) :: 
  requestCaseRecordByID(I) ⇐ a(clinician_classify, CID)  
grantPermission(CID, I, Read, Normal_classify_from_local_site, 
Local_database_read_policy_set) then 
  caseRecord(R)  a(clinician_classify, CID)  
getCaseRecordByID(I, R) then 
  a(database_update, DBID) 
/* R6: update a case record after classification */ 
a(database_update, DBID) :: 
  updateCaseRecordByID(I) ⇐ a(clinician_followingdiagnosis, CID) 
 grantPermission(CID, I, Update, Normal_update_from_local_site, 
Local_database_update_policy_set) then 
  caseRecordUpdated (Y)  a(clinician_followingdiagnosis, CID) 
The notion a(id, role) defines the role one 
should play and its identity can be bound with 
workgroup memberships and professional 
specialists at runtime. Access policies, either 
identity-specific or role-related, as defined in 
clinical environment and governing access 
strategies, will be applied against the defined role 
play behaviour.  
A clinician not in the right workgroup may be 
able to download a case but cannot update it. 
Similarly, a user identity is bound with 
professional specialists and constraints about 
their access to case partitions applied at runtime, 
e.g. only the named clinicians may update or 
write major diagnosis results; certain specialists 
may write reports in their areas; others on the 
case care list may only read those areas. Thus, a 
three dimension resource request of (user, 
resource, operation) will be constrained in two 
dimensions: user-resource must match 
workgroup membership (constraint 1) and user-
operation match clinical information access 
needs (constraint 2).  
It is at the point of checking the LCC 
constraint of “grantPermission” that user 
workgroup and speciality, as well as the case 
under consideration will be related (clinician 
identity of CID and case identity of I), prior to 
the required operation/interaction. The running 
and execution of LCC specification is supported 
by the OpenKnowledge kernel [8]. 
 
6. Future work  
 
The HRB Centre for Primary Care Research 
is undertaking a 5-year programme with an aim 
of developing and evaluating information and 
communication technology (ICT) based decision 
support system that focuses on evidence-based 
practice in relation to improved diagnosis, 
clinical management and co-ordination. The 
major decision aids for patients rely upon the 
electronic clinical prediction rules (eCPRs). An 
example prediction rule as such, Centor Score 
[9], provides a practical tool that helps doctors to 
decide on the management of patients with sore 
throat or strep throat and whether an antibiotic is 
required. Using LCC, we can encode the relevant 
clinical practice guidelines or protocols and 
define the process in the following interaction 
model, enabling collaborative decision making in 
a distributed environment. 
a(score_calculator, SCID):: 
  patient_data(P) ⇐ a(GP_request(P), GPID) then 
  score(s)  a(diagnosis_manager(P), DMID) 
   s = temperature(P, higher, 38) + cough(P, no) + cervical(P, 
swelling) + tonsils(P, swelling) + age(P, less, 15) 
 
a(diagnosis_manager(P), DMID):: 
  a(score_calculator, SCID  score(s)  then 
  ( recommend(P, no_antibiotic)  a(GP_request(P), GPID) 
 s = 0 or s = 1 ) 
  or 
  ( recommend(P, antibiotic)  a(GP_request(P), GPID) 
 (s = 2 or s = 3) and culture_result = positive ) 
  or 
  ( recommend(P, antibiotic)  a(GP_request(P), GPID) 
 s = 4 ) 
First, a GP sends the patient data including 
symptoms to a score calculator. The calculator 
determines the patient’s total sore throat score by 
adding up points on the basis of relevant criteria. 
Then, the total score is sent by the calculator to a 
diagnosis manager. Its role is to give GP 
suggestions on the basis of the patient’s total 
score. Finally, the doctor can make a decision 
based on the conclusions drawn from the 
interaction.  
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In this simple example, clinical prediction 
rules are explicitly embedded into the functions 
of two role players, score calculator and 
diagnosis manager. They take in patient 
symptoms and apply the clinical knowledge 
which was drawn from past experience against 
the current case. Imagine when a doctor is using 
a GP system with the symptoms and other related 
patient information available, such an interaction 
can be implicitly triggered and a diagnosis 
recommendation presented to the GP for decision 
making. The integration of these clinical 
prediction rules with current GP systems in a 
seamless healthcare workflow can greatly reduce 
the likelihood of misdiagnosis, evidence 
omission, or prescribing errors, and eventually 
improve the quality of care. 
It is also conceivable that in the interaction 
model we show, the score calculator role may be 
played by one or more healthcare specialists, 
giving their part of conclusions to a series of 
evidence accumulation and decision support 
process in a bigger picture. Thus, a healthcare 
team with various specialists, clinical data and 
evidence holders, and clinical prediction rule 
functions can interact together and contribute to 
the final care delivery, in a pervasive setting. 
Selected healthcare data, being a subset (or full 
set) of the patient’s record, is passed around to 
specialists with appropriate role for their 
opinions in different fields. Interaction models 
defined using LCC have the capability to express 
the knowledge flow, glue together the clinicians’ 
expertise of the fields for collaboration, and the 
application of the supporting prediction rules at 
the right time at the right place. When a 
specialist is about to request data, his or her 
privilege to view/write to the entire patient 
record or part of it and further interpret it for 
clinical purpose is subject to the access policies 
associated with his or her ID/role. 
The approach is promising and should be able 
to solve the complicated healthcare environment 
we are confronted with today in many countries: 
data, knowledge, and expertise being 
fragmented. Two major components coming into 
the picture help to build an effective and 
systematic approach: 1) clinical prediction rules 
take in the particular clinical symptoms and 
evidence on a patient-specific basis and suggest 
decisions or suggest intermediate evidence which 
later contributes to the final decisions with 
regard to this particular patient; 2) interaction 
models enable knowledge sharing, elicitation, 
and generation, and finally drawing clinical 
conclusions, with data protection regulations 
respected. In our research centre, the use of the 
approach as well as other methods will be further 
investigated in the next five years, with an 
eventual aim to improve the quality of Irish 
healthcare. 
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